The host argues that the most effective way to stop a smart TV reporting on a household is to force all its DNS through filtering servers you control, such as Pi-hole, while blocking every other DNS server, layered on a network split into isolated VLANs. He concedes the limits: DNS over HTTPS cannot be blocked, true isolation of a TV from its neighbours costs you casting or needs ACL-capable switches, and none of this is for beginners. He demonstrates it in UniFi through House Arrest, a free, open-source tool of his own.
The problem. Drawing on Gamers Nexus's findings, he reports that recent LG TVs scan the local network for device names, MAC and IP addresses and signal strength, and scan nearby Wi-Fi networks, which researchers believe is used to locate the TV. That location travels with ACR (automatic content recognition) data, which fingerprints whatever is on screen, including from an Apple TV or Roku. A TV used purely as an HDMI monitor still sent location roughly 20 times a minute. LG's ad business says about 33 million US TVs feed it data, used for cross-device targeting and also licensed to others. Samsung and LG have settled lawsuits; Sony, Hisense and TCL are still in litigation. Whether the device inventory is sent is his inference, not evidence: the traffic is encrypted, and a firmware update could change what goes out.
Network design. On his UCG Fiber, he recommends three VLANs: a default network for network gear, NAS, printers and PCs; a guest network with internet access only; and an IoT network for the TV, thermostats and similar. UniFi's zone-based firewall allows all traffic between networks in the internal zone by default, unlike enterprise firewalls that deny by default. Network isolation closes that: guest and IoT are isolated, default is not, so a PC on default can reach Home Assistant on IoT but IoT cannot initiate connections back.
Isolation within a VLAN. Wired device isolation is enforced by switch ACLs, and UniFi lists the switches it does not cover. A TV on a Lite 8 PoE hanging off a Pro Max core switch still sees every device on the small switch. Wi-Fi client isolation works well and suits guest networks, but on IoT it breaks the device-to-device traffic smart gear needs. Either form of isolation stops casting. Disabling internet access network-wide suits a camera VLAN, not a TV that needs streaming and updates. mDNS forwarding lets a device advertise across VLANs, but with network isolation on the cast then times out, so he advises casting only within one VLAN and turning forwarding off.
DNS lockdown. His two Pi-holes, at 192.168.200.50 and .51, are handed out by DHCP. He prefers them to UniFi's content filter, whose granular controls require CyberSecure at $99 a year. The lockdown points DHCP at the approved servers, allows the isolated network through to them on port 53, and blocks DNS and DNS over TLS (port 853) to the LAN and the internet, defeating TVs with hard-coded DNS. Streaming domains resolve while telemetry is refused; Roku is the biggest offender in his logs. The costs: any device with static DNS breaks, as one of his own PCs did, and clients fail until their DHCP lease renews.
Device-level controls. For flat networks or single devices needing tighter rules, presets offer internet only, LAN only, no internet and quarantine, with blocked attempts over the past 24 hours visible. The same-network block again depends on ACL switches. He says he built the tool with Claude Code, shows the JSON before applying, and offers one-click rollback. He has tried casting-aware profiles but held them back as too unreliable.